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Abstract: Extractive foreign direct investment (FDI) is heralded as the new development 
opportunity in Africa. But extractive FDI has a record of producing enclaves in host countries with 
few linkages to the local economy. Only if it creates local content will extractive FDI become a 
catalyst of development. This paper analyses the trajectories of local content policies and practices 
in three African countries – Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique. We argue that we cannot 
understand the dynamics and outcomes of local content policies in African extractives without 
understanding how local content has become ingrained in ruling coalitions’ rent-seeking and 
maintenance activities in the three countries. We discuss the consequences of evolving local 
content practices for political patronage.   
 
Introduction 
Extractives are considered the new development opportunity for Africa (UNECA, 2013; AEO, 2013; 
UNCTAD, 2013).1 To exploit these resources, Africa needs foreign direct investment by extractive 
multinational companies (MNCs) as Africa lacks the technology, expertise and market access that 
is needed to capitalize on natural resource endowments. Africa has seen a massive surge in 
extractives FDI over the past decade, during which 60% of all FDI being invested in Africa has been 
in natural resource extraction (AEO 2013).2 This FDI offers potentially huge development 
opportunities: extractive FDI may generate government revenue and export income and more 
broadly create jobs and income. Indirectly, extractive FDI may facilitate economic growth through 
trickle-down effects and may spur employment and income generation in agriculture, industry and 
services through linkages and spillovers (Jourdan 2008; Morris et al. 2011a).  
Several reports from international organizations and researchers have recently focused on how 
extractive MNCs can be induced to link up to African host economies (UNCTAD, 2010; UNECA, 
2013; Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2011; Morrissey, 2012; Buur et al 2013; Altenburg, 2013; Hansen, 
                                                          
1
 In this paper our focus is big investments in energy (oil, gas and coal) and minerals. This is a subset of extractive 
industries involved in natural resource sectors, which also include production related to land (i.e. forestry, agriculture) 
and to fisheries. See Morris et al. (2011a: 8) for a recent classification. 
2
 For resource-rich countries investments were even higher. Alone during the 2000s three quarters of all FDI in Africa 
went to the resource-rich countries (African Development Bank, 2013: 47), up from two thirds in the 1990s (Arbache 
et al. 2008: 73). 
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2014). It is argued that a key condition for more inclusive FDI is that foreign extractive investors 
foster broad and deep linkages with the host economy through local sourcing of functions and 
activities, the training and guidance of local firms, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
programmes, and engagement in local capacity building (see UNCTAD 2005, 2010; AEO 2013). By 
fostering such linkages, extractive MNCs may not only spur job creation and upgrades both 
upstream and downstream in the extractive industries; they may also create broader spillovers in 
other industries, for example in the form of demonstration and competition effects (Morrissey 
2012) and may thereby promote industrial diversification. Ultimately, linkages in extractives may 
assist industrial development and economic transformation by developing skills and capabilities in 
local manufacturing and service sectors (UNECA 2013). 
Of all the aspects of linkages, local content - understood as the extent to which MNCs purchase 
inputs and services locally – has become a disputed aspect, both in the literature on FDI and 
empirically. While taxation and royalties are still the focus of much debate, local content has now 
also become a battleground of extractive-based development. Across Africa, governments are 
introducing local content measures in legislation and concessions, and MNCs and local economic 
entrepreneurs are struggling to meet growing demands for local content. In this article, we focus 
on the dynamics of local content development:  what has been attempted so far, and what shapes 
these practices? In our analysis we highlight key lessons from case studies of local content 
practices in three East African countries: Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique.  
Our argument has three intertwined parts. First, we argue that the literature with an economic 
perspective on local content correctly suggests that low absorption capacity by domestic 
economic entrepreneurs hinders linkage formation. But that problem is more than a technical 
issue, which could have easily been rectified. The real problem is that ruling elites have little 
incentive to support linkage development for domestic economic entrepreneurs if they are 
without much political importance for the survival of the ruling elites. Instead, ruling elites protect 
and engage with domestic economic entrepreneurs who have already captured the local content 
markets, because this is where rents can be extracted from entrepreneurs in support of elite 
political survival strategies. Secondly, we argue that while low institutional capacity and 
governance (including corruption), are indeed important problems, they are not really the real 
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issue. Few societies have a ‘pure’ or perfectly functioning institutional governance setup across all 
sectors. Such problems would be solved if implementation of industrial policies for linkage 
development actually mattered for the ruling elites. Then they would ensure that ‘pockets of 
institutional and governance efficiency’ would be created and supported.   Finally, we argue that 
an appreciation of how deeply local content has become ingrained in ruling coalitions’ rent-
seeking and maintenance activities in the three countries is the key to understanding the dynamics 
and outcomes of local content policies in African extractives.  
We start out by explaining what local content is. We then move on to contrast economic and 
political economy perspectives on local content. In the empirical part we present three case 
analyses of local content dynamics in Africa in light of the economic and political economy 
perspectives outlined. The concluding section highlights key findings emerging from the analysis 
and suggests possible future research avenues.  
What is local content? 
Local content is the extent to which foreign producers of goods and services procure inputs in the 
form of goods and services from the local economy. In the case of extractives, this can be inputs at 
different stages of the investment cycle (prospecting, feasibility phase, establishment, operations 
and decommissioning) and it can be inputs of different kinds (engineering services, maintenance, 
equipment, catering, security, transport, training, etc.). Local content in extractive operations 
ranges from almost zero in some developing countries to an average of 45-75% in more advanced 
resource-rich economies (Ado, 2013). 
MNCs create local content as part of their sourcing strategies and in response to public policy. As 
has previously been the case with manufacturing and services, natural resource extraction has 
recently witnessed a profound international disintegration of value chains (Morris et al. 2011b). 
This disintegration, which some refer to as ‘outsourcing’, takes place to reduce costs, spread risks, 
obtain the benefits of specialization and tap into the resources and capabilities of other firms (BSR 
2011; Singh and Bourgouin, 2013). Hence, we have seen a significant restructuring of extractive 
MNCs where they simultaneously focus on core activities such as management, finance and 
technology and at the same time shed non-core activities such as prospecting, operation, catering, 
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transport, HRM, etc. As the boundaries for outsourcing in the industry expand, so the value of 
MNCs’ procurement increases (UNCTAD 2005; Urzua 2007; Mjimba 2011).3  
Governments across the world can promote local content in various ways. Local content policy is 
particularly widespread in industries such as defence, wind turbines, automobiles, oil and gas and, 
more recently, the mining and construction industries. The issue of local content has, as Ado 
(2013) reports, become increasingly important and developing countries have introduced a tide of 
local content requirements and rules in recent years, indicating a significant change in policy 
toward more restrictive approaches to foreign investors (UNCTAD, 2013). Across Africa, mining 
codes and oil and gas concessions contain more or less elaborate provisions for local ownership, 
hiring and procurement, all aimed at mitigating the inherent enclave nature of much extractive 
activity (Todaro, 2013). Among the measures employed to create local content are rules 
stipulating percentages for local procurements; tariffs, taxes and pricing aimed at facilitating local 
content; licensing and concessions dependent on ability to create local content; local firm 
reservations for certain inputs and services; requirements on service provision, etc. (Hufbauer et 
al, 2013).  Local content can be promoted both directly and indirectly.  
Indirect measures focus on activities to enhance the competitiveness of local supply industries 
such as supplier development programmes, and information dissemination (UNCTAD, 2010). 
Direct measures include import tariffs, local content requirements in general legislation and 
specific concessions. These can be restrictive measures such as percentage limits on imports, 
mandated local suppliers, and penalties if local content is not achieved; or facilitating measures 
like subsidies for local content, supplier development programmes and improvements to 
infrastructure. Local content policy is very much a question of finding a balance between 
restricting and facilitating measures. Being too restrictive may raise input costs (or undermine 
quality) to an extent where the investment is rendered unprofitable. Too much subsidy without 
enforcement may lead to waste of scarce public funds and limit the transfer of technology and 
capabilities.  
                                                          
3
 While local content is typically part of the procurement function of MNCs, it is sometimes construed as CSR; as ways 
of involving local communities and being a good corporate citizen in the various locations they operate. This article 
will not deal with this kind of local content provision. 
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Perspectives on local content 
Much of the academic literature on local content is based on economic logic: the point is to ensure 
that rents from foreign-controlled extractive operations stay in the host country4  so as to 
promote local economic development and produce spillovers from extractives to other industries. 
However, there is another perspective on local content that focuses not on economic welfare and 
efficiency but on political economy and the processes in which these practices are ingrained. 
Below we contrast the economic and political economy perspectives on local content with a view 
to developing a conceptual framework that can guide the subsequent analysis of local content 
practices in Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda.    
The economics of local content 
In parallel with the growing interests in local content measures, a bourgeoning economic literature 
has emerged that focuses on the conditions and effects of local content in African extractives and 
how it should be promoted (see Morrissey (2012); Kazzazi and Nouri (2012) and Hansen (2014) for 
overviews). Liberal trade economists generally view local content measures as welfare reducing as 
they distort trade and FDI (Grossman 1981; Ado 2010). Warner (2010) argues that local content 
rules may significantly affect MNCs’ net present value (NPV) calculation and internal rate of return 
(IRR) and that local content requirements will eventually reduce overall trade and FDI. A recent 
conservative estimate suggests that local content requirements of all countries  affect 2% of global 
trade across all sectors and reduce it by USD 93 billion annually (Warner 2010; Hufbauer et al, 
2013). Furthermore, it is argued that local content requirements may be harmful to the local 
investment climate as they fundamentally alter the competitiveness of domestic players over 
foreign players, thus potentially leading to economic inefficiencies. 
                                                          
4
 Rents are payment to a factor of production in excess of its opportunity costs i.e. beyond normal profits. Rents can 
be obtained by the firms involved in the activity (e.g. if they have monopoly) or they can be obtained by external 
stakeholders such as governments, employees, politicians and bureaucrats. Rents can be obtained through legal 
means such as tariffs, taxation, royalties and contracts, but they can also be syphoned through means such as 
protected monopsonies, monopolies, favoritism and corruption (see Khan 2000a; 2000b; Kaplinsky 2005 and for local 
content see for example Altenburg and Melia, 2014). 
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However, proponents argue that local content, when designed the right way, will support local 
industrial development through the difficult transition phase from hitherto protected economies 
toward economies integrated in the global economy. The collateral effects of FDI – so called 
spillover effects – may lead to upgrading and learning of local industries by exposing them to 
global competition and standards (Morrissey, 2012). Proponents of local content point to the fact 
that most advanced countries, while in the early stages of their industrial development, employed 
protective measures including local content (Chang, 2002; Whitfield et al. 2015). According to this 
logic, local content can assist the development of weak local industries, facilitate technology 
transfers and thereby close the huge technology gap between many of these countries and the 
more developed countries. This furthermore potentially increases domestic production and job 
creation. The justification for such measures is that infant industries need to be protected and that 
the market power of MNCs needs to be curbed or ‘directed’ towards developing linkages. Ado 
(2013) summarizes the argument in favour of local content succinctly as being related to 1. 
Protecting infant industry; 2. Curbing market power of foreign industry vis-a-vis local industry; 3. 
Providing social compensation to and working in harmony with local communities suffering the 
environmental and social costs of exploitation; and 4. Protection of strategic sectors.  
Economists are well aware that local content requires some fairly demanding conditions to be 
fulfilled to succeed. In particular three factors are emphasized by the literature: 1. Appropriate 
policies; 2. Appropriate institutions; 3. Local industry capability. 
Appropriate policies 
Local content rules can be quite demanding and should therefore be introduced in a transparent 
and gradual manner that allows local and foreign firms to adapt. Often, local content policies focus 
on placing demands on foreign investors rather than on developing the technological, commercial, 
organizational and absorptive capacity of local industry and/or the local business environment 
required for local content (Hufbauer, 2013). Moreover, rules should treat investors equally to 
avoid distorting competition and should not (as is often the case) be introduced ex post and in an 
arbitrary manner that ignores the time horizon of local content investments. It is also a problem 
that local content rules are often formulated as intentions and vague objectives so that investors 
become uncertain because of regulators’ high level of discretion. As local content rules may have 
large hidden costs (e.g. in the form of foregone investments) or visible costs (e.g. in the form of tax 
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exemptions and subsidies), it is vital that they are subjected to rigorous cost benefit analysis, 
something that is rarely done (Todaro, 2013) - or done due to the ex post and arbitrary manner in 
which rules are often implemented. 
Appropriate institutions 
From a classic economic perspective local content arises from a contract-based market exchange 
between two private entities. To succeed, this requires institutions to facilitate and support 
contracts, including institutions that can reduce information asymmetries (e.g. providing 
information about quality and skills of local suppliers); reduce monitoring costs (e.g. transparent 
accounting and reporting rules); and reduce costs of contract enforcement (e.g. efficient courts 
and judicial procedures). As the contractual environment throughout much of Africa is generally 
extremely weak (e.g. measured through doing business indicators), extractive MNCs and their 
local content activities are often poorly monitored so that local content activities essentially 
become ‘window dressing’ (Buur et al 2013).   
Local industrial capability 
From an economic perspective, it is not enough to have the right policies and the right institutions 
in place. (Diyamat, 2011; Hufbauer, 2013). If there is no local industry, local content does not 
make sense. Hence, local content policy needs to take into account the actual state of local 
industry as well as provide measures for developing local industrial capacity. The problem in large 
parts of Africa is partly that capable local supply industries are virtually non-existent and partly 
that the technology and organizational gap, in respect to MNCs, is too large to bridge. Due to that 
gap local firms are typically only able to make inputs requiring low technological and 
organizational skills such as catering, transport and security. The weak local capacity implies that 
developing local content in the best of cases would be a very long-term process (Amendolaigne et 
al. 2013; Merlevede et al. 2011).  
The politics of local content  
Classic economic perspectives on local content focus on efficiency and welfare maximization. 
Deviations from efficient policies lead to welfare loss. Thus, failure to benefit from local content 
policies will be due to the fact that policies deviate from the Pareto optimality. Governments need 
to adopt the right kind of policies and make sure that the conditions for local content to succeed 
9 
 
are in place, including institutions to back the policies up and making sure that local industry has 
the capabilities required to link up to foreign MNCs. However, a competing understanding views 
local content through the lens of politics. It focuses on the institutions through which politics is 
conducted in African resource-rich countries and the relationship between political and economic 
elites of African societies (see Khan 2010; Whitfield et al. 2015). 
A political economy along these lines related to local content focuses on the way rents are used by 
patrons to satisfy and to award clients and thereby maintain power (Buur 2014; Altenburg and 
Meia 2014; Altenburg 2011; Whitfield et al. 2015). Rents are important because what sets most 
African countries apart from other developing countries is the lack of African domestic capitalists 
who can formally fund the political system through taxes (Khan 2010; Whitfield et al. 2015). As 
Whitfield et al. (2015 Introduction) argues: “the small size and limited capabilities of black African 
capitalists, and the fact that they did not dominate the key exporting sectors of the economy, 
shaped the political settlement in ways that took on path dependent trajectories in the post-
independence period”.5 This predicament has had important consequences for how patron-client 
relationships operate and rents are generated. The fact that the total production and productivity 
in most developing countries is extremely low has the important implication that the formal 
economy cannot sustain their political settlements. Only a fraction of domestic production is taxed 
because much of the economy is outside the ‘formal’ capitalist sector. Hence, political settlements 
must be achieved through other means.  
A political settlement approach as promulgated by Whitfield et al. (2015) focuses on two cardinal 
axes of analysis: the first axis is the structure of the ruling coalition supporting the elite in power 
and how contested it is internally and in relation to excluded factions; the second axis is the 
relative political influence and capabilities of domestic capitalists. A stable political settlement 
distributes rents and access to resources to actors in ways that do not threaten political stability 
and fuel violence by excluding powerful factions.  
                                                          
5
 ‘Political settlement’ is shorthand for the set of institutions and power relations that characterize social order in a 
particular country, and that create benefits for different classes and groups in society in line with their relative power 
(Khan 2010). At any particular point in time, the political settlement reflects a kind of equilibrium, as the distribution 
of benefits reinforces the distribution of power in society. Contestations about rents are intense because the formal 
economy alone cannot fund the ruling coalitions. 
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Ruling coalitions in African countries are typically fragmented and are striving to maintain power 
through patronage organized both through the formal state budget and informal means. So the 
appropriation and allocation of rents is usually crucial for regime survival as system maintenance 
and consolidation depends, to a large degree, on its ability to distribute rents to constituencies. 
The informal and rent-based nature of political settlements thus complicates the targeting of local 
content provisions based on mutual interests between the political leaders and domestic 
economic entrepreneurs and makes it difficult to enforce their implementation. Political elites get 
their funding and revenues from the largest firms (often between 3-400 larger firms like in Uganda 
and Tanzania, see Therkildsen forthcoming) related to the banking, telecom and trader 
import/export sectors, where the most important sources of political financing are generated in 
and around politically protected monopolies.  
Local content rules in such situations are used by ruling elites – assisted by bureaucrats loyal to 
them - as instruments to maintain power by awarding contracts, jobs and opportunities to 
financers of the ruling coalitions, rather than promoting development of local enterprises by 
SMEs. In other words, contracts to local firms tend to be awarded for the wrong reasons from an 
economic efficiency perspective.  Actually, local content contracts are in many respects becoming 
the next frontier in rent-seeking activities in East Africa. Whereas taxation and royalty payments 
are subject to increasingly strict international rules and to pockets of local efficiencies (Lundstøl, 
2012), local content remains a fairly unregulated arena, making it highly susceptible to the kind of 
rent seeking that underpins ruling elites’ ability to maintain power. Elites use local content policies 
for maintaining legitimacy and building support in various ways: jobs created at local companies 
and in local communities become an asset that can be used to generate political benefits; and 
rents are acquired and distributed  to consolidate the authority of ruling elites and to ensure their 
survival in power (see Buur et al. 2013). Due to the weak position of the local capitalist class, local 
content easily results in the promotion of inefficient and inexperienced but politically well-
connected firms. Local content in these circumstances is unlikely to be pursued with a view to 
promoting economic efficiency.  
So low absorption capacity by domestic economic entrepreneurs hinders linkage formation but 
not only because they have few capabilities; more importantly, we argue, because such 
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entrepreneurs have limited political importance the ruling elites have little motivation to support 
them and their linkage development. This has important implications for how we understand 
appropriate policies and institutions. Recent studies suggest that despite corruption, appropriate 
policies are developed and institutional capacity indeed is created when it matters for the ruling 
elites and their political survival. Generally, tax authorities,  Investment Promoting Agencies 
(Pitcher 2012) and petroleum institutes (in East African countries) (Buur et al. 2013.) have been set 
up and function well throughout Africa as revenues and investments matters to political elites. The 
real issue is that if implementation of industrial policies for linkage development mattered for the 
ruling elites then ‘pockets’ of institutional and governance efficiency would be created and 
supported.  
In sum, the economic perspective points to the importance of measures to promote local content 
and improve local industrial capacity, whereas the political economy perspective points to the 
likelihood of such measures being captured by patrons for political purposes.  
The dynamics of local content in three African countries 
We move now to illustrate some of these points by analysing local content policies in Tanzania, 
Uganda and Mozambique. We first examine the nature and success of local content practices in 
the three countries and then discuss how these practices can be understood.  
The surge in extractive FDI 
All three countries have seen a huge surge in extractive FDI. Historically, large investments in gold 
and uranium have been undertaken. More recently, coal, nickel and iron have attracted FDI. Most 
attention has been devoted to recent discoveries of huge offshore natural gas reserves off 
Mozambique and Tanzania, as well as oil in Uganda and Kenya. These are pulling mega-
investments to East Africa, which have raised rent expectations as well as hopes for reaping the 
spoils of linkage formation in the form of  job creation, technology transfer and industrial 
upgrading.   
In all three countries, it has been of paramount importance that the mistakes of previous rounds 
of extractive FDI are not repeated. In Tanzania, the perception is that the country saw too few 
benefits from the first round of extractive FDI, which took place from the mid-1990s in the wake of 
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the Structural Adjustment Program liberalizations in the 1980s. Moreover, tax breaks and 
ambiguous and unfocused local content policies left too few lasting development benefits from 
extractive FDI, which amounted to more than USD 1.1 billion in 2012, (the highest in East Africa). 
These investments were overwhelmingly in gold, diamonds, nickel, uranium, coal, iron and natural 
gas. The Tanzanian government is determined that the coming round of extractive FDI in sectors 
such as gas, iron and coal will be better aligned with Tanzania’s development objectives and the 
country is formally improving its mining codes and legislations accordingly (Hansen 2014).  
Mozambique’s history of natural resource extraction is more recent than Tanzania’s. In addition to 
hydroelectricity, the country is endowed with an abundance of important minerals and natural 
resources including gas, coal, gold, titanium, ilmenite, zircon, rutile, marble and a variety of 
precious stones and other metals. From 1997 until 2009, mega-projects (aluminum, heavy sand, 
coal and gas) have generated FDI inflows amounting to approximately USD 8.4 billion (USAID, 
2012: vii) and they have created a very different dynamic with regard to SME development than 
the Tanzanian gold investments did (see Buur et al., 2013). This, however, pales in relation to 
future investments in gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities, which are expected to exceed 
USD 50 billion over the next 10 years (Ledesma, 2013; Besseling, 2013). Mozambique is now 
expected to become one of the world’s largest producers of LNG aimed at the Asian growth 
markets. Based on estimates that the discoveries hold at least 100 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 
Anadarko (USA), together with ENI (Italian state company), are currently in the process of 
designing facilities involving at least two on-shore LNG ‘trains’, with the capacity to expand to ten 
trains (NORAD, 2012: 13; Ledesma, 2013; Besseling, 2013).   
In Uganda, there is some mining, and oil has been explored since 2006. The government has 
signed production sharing agreements with three large companies: French Total, British Tullow, 
and the state-owned Chinese company CNOCC. They expect to start pumping the first oil around 
2017. Expectations among both Ugandan citizens and the government about future revenues and 
subsequent national wealth are high. In its national development plan, the government expresses 
its wish to use oil revenue for the benefit of economic diversification, technology upgrading and 
general development.  The government has also focused on local content provision.  
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Local content policies and programmes  
In Mozambique, new legislation for gas and coal is being developed and new tax regimes have also 
been approved (including an as yet unenforced capital gains tax (CIP 2013)) , but so far no local 
content or technology transfer clauses have been directly proposed. However, measures for local 
industry development have been adopted. Following in the slipstream of mega-investments since 
the mid-1990s and the attempt at creating linkages related to the MOZAL aluminium smelter, 
Mozambique has developed an organisational and institutional setup for SME development. The 
most important of these, at least by name, are the “Industrial Policy and Strategy” from 2007 and 
the related “Strategy for the Development of Small and Medium Size Enterprises in Mozambique” 
from the same year (Krause and Kaufman 2011: 29).  
Generally, the Tanzanian FDI and mining legislation has adopted a liberal approach to foreign 
investors, with few formal restrictions related to ownership and local content. But the government 
is currently revising legislation for minerals, FDI and oil and gas in order to ensure much more local 
content and technology transfer, e.g. through local content requirements and supplier 
development programmes. According to the 1998 Mining Act, certain parts of the exploration 
cycle are reserved for companies that are solely owned by Tanzanian citizens. Second, there are 
provisions to promote backward and forward linkages. The 2010 Mining Act further stipulates that 
MNCs seeking prospecting and mining licenses are expected to draw up lists of goods and services 
that can be provided by local firms. Moreover, there are provisions to facilitate the establishment 
of training institutions to develop industry-supporting skills, as well as to encourage foreign 
investors to contribute to the development of skills and capabilities. However, it is noticeable that 
there are no mandatory provisions for the creation of backward and forward linkages in the 
Tanzanian legislation. The existing provisions are vague and non-binding, and the process of 
forming linkages is largely left to market forces (Mjimba, 2011; UNECA, 2013).  
In Uganda, policies for local linkage formation are recent and the extractives industry is relatively 
narrow. The policy framework for local linkage formation can be considered to be in place. The 
National Oil and Gas policy of 2008 sets the broad framework. In line with the overall Vision 2040, 
the goal is to use Uganda’s oil resources to reduce poverty and promote the country’s 
socioeconomic transformation. Some of the sub-objectives of this overall goal are to ensure 
national participation in oil and gas activities and to enhance the development of Ugandan citizens 
14 
 
with skills to participate in the oil investments. To enact the policy, there are different bills, laws 
and acts. The most relevant bill for local content is the Petroleum Exploration, Development and 
Production Bill (2012), in which there are no provisions for mandatory linkages or indications of 
percentages of local content. However, a number of requirements are listed. For example, license 
applicants need to come up with plans for local employment and training, as well as proposals for 
the procurement of goods and services in Uganda (RoU, 2012: 20).  
Challenges of local content 
While there is no doubt that consideration of local content has been growing in the three 
countries, the measures adopted are still rudimentary and they are being implemented in a 
context that makes their success illusive.  
If the hallmarks of good industrial policies are targeting, prioritizing and enforcing conditions for 
productivity, then the policy and strategies adopted in Mozambique are rather vague. The 
industrial policy suggests that “the Government does not want to ‘miss anything’” (Krause and 
Kaufman 2011: 28) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM 2009: 165) specifically 
lambasted the lost opportunity for providing clear strategic guidance on how such investment 
could be used to boost economic development in the future. The Mozambican SME strategy, in 
contrast, was elaborated by external consultants, with donor assistance and some consultation 
with the Confederation of Economic Associations, as well as the Ministry for Trade and Industry. 
While defining priorities and objectives for SME development and proposing a certain sequencing 
of actions with the establishment in 2008 of an Institute for the Promotion of Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises (IPEMA), the strategy does not seem to have had much impact so far (Krause and 
Kaufman 2011: 30). IPEMA is supposed to drive the implementation of the SME strategy, but it 
relies largely on external funding. Interestingly, donor organisations, while supportive of IPEMA, 
have largely continued to focus on running, establishing or renewing their own organisations and 
institutional linkage programs such as the World Bank “Project for Entrepreneurial Development” 
(PODE), which operates its own matching grand scheme for co-financing training sessions, 
consultancies and export promotion, and is keen on linking Mozambican enterprises to present 
mega-investments. In 2009 the Bank added the “New Mozambique Competitiveness and Private 
Sector Development Project”, whose USD 25 million budget is far bigger than the budget of 
IPEMA.  
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Part of the problem of local content promotion in Mozambique is related to the underdeveloped 
private sector. The enterprise structure is highly skewed, consisting of: 1.) a few big enterprises, in 
part owned by foreign capital and in part by the state or members or close affiliates of the Frelimo 
top elite; 2.) a few formally registered SMEs owned by both foreign and domestic capital that have 
had little clustering effect; and 3.) a large stratum of informal micro-enterprises (sometimes 
referred to as SSMEs) owned by domestic entrepreneurs, which make up 98.6 % of all enterprises 
(Krause and Kaufman 2011: 13-14; Sutton 2014). The skewed nature of the enterprise structure 
characterised by the ‘missing middle’ of SMEs, which are of little political and economic interest to 
the ruling political elite, has severe consequences for linking up to the present wave of mega-
investments in natural resources. These offer few prospects for growth for micro-businesses and 
very limited intra- and inter-firm and sector linkages with strategic clustering and networking. The 
SMEs that have emerged as part of mega-investment linkage programmes have more often than 
not been new enterprises established for that purpose by the political elite or persons closely 
related to the ruling elite, so the space for the few competitive formal SMEs who can qualify as the 
business partners of mega-investments is extremely limited (da Costa 2012). As a consequence 
most of the ‘local inputs’ – backward linkages created - are provided by foreign firms and service 
providers that have become localised by operating through local firms or having a Mozambican 
partner as a local figurehead. 
Tanzania has been unsuccessful in its attempts to foster linkages between foreign firms and local 
industry. While the growing FDI inflows have offered many benefits to Tanzanian development in 
terms of exports and technology transfer, Tanzania has not been able to reap the full potential of 
these investments, and linkages in extractives remain weak and shallow where backward linkages 
are usually provided by foreign firms and service providers (Hansen, 2014). The largest FDI sector 
is in gold mining, which has failed to produce broad and deep local horizontal and vertical linkages 
and local jobs. In their pursuit of greater efficiency, reduced costs, risk diversification and asset 
augmentation, MNCs are indeed fostering many linkages with supplier and service providers, 
although these are mainly foreign firms. The high standards required provide prohibitive entry 
barriers for a local industry that rarely has the capacity or the strategic vision to contract with 
extractive MNCs.   
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The reasons for the lack of linkages are numerous. Most importantly, the mining regulation lacks 
the specific targets, monitoring mechanisms, incentives and sanctions needed to reach the overall 
development objectives related to dealing with the weak local industry capacity (Mjimba, 2011). 
This is because those that should be protected and targeted by providing specific rent 
opportunities are of little importance to the survival of the ruling CCM coalition. There is therefore 
little interest in dealing with the problems related to the institutional environment surrounding 
extractive FDI. This in turn has serious repercussions for how FDIs engage with potential domestic 
linkage partners and undermines efforts to form linkages with local industry as it constrains the 
development of viable local supplier firms (Perkins and Robbins 2011). It furthermore renders 
contract-based collaborations between MNCs and local firms difficult to establish and maintain 
due to uncertain and inefficient contract enforcement. The industry structure in Tanzania is, as in 
Mozambique, characterized by a ‘missing middle,’ that is, very few SME enterprises. Instead 
Tanzania is dominated by informal micro-enterprises and a handful of relatively large 
conglomerates that are politically well connected and well protected behind tariff and non-tariff 
entry barriers.  
In Uganda, as with the other two countries, much of the challenge lies in weak local capacity. In 
Uganda manufacturing has grown, but from a very low level – in 2010 it accounted for 8.5 % of 
GDP, not much higher than the level achieved in 1960. Manufacturing is overwhelmingly 
characterized by informal small enterprises with very few employees and low levels of technology. 
Interviews with representatives of government, multinationals and local companies clearly 
showed that there was a lack of local capacity in Uganda and that it would be very difficult to 
implement specific requirements of local content, for example a rule that there should be fifty per 
cent of local equity, which had been debated in parliament but not enacted. A recent report 
commissioned by Uganda’s Petroleum Department estimates the share of total foreign investment 
in the petroleum sector that is retained in Uganda (and therefore can be used as a proxy for local 
content in service etc.) to be around 14 per cent (RoU, 2011b). This suggests that local inputs are 
more often than not provided by foreign firms and service providers. Indeed, so far there have 
been few successful initiatives to promote local capacity or transform the economy (Kjær and 
Katusiimeh, 2012). Infrastructure remains highly inadequate, and the challenges the emerging oil 
industry faces will be on the implementation side, especially with regard to the big gap between 
17 
 
what the foreign companies demand and the local ones supply (Shepherd, 2013). Hence, so far 
there has been no effective industrial policy (Kjær 2013). The worry on the part of the oil 
companies is that they may not be free to choose the best sub-contractors because, according to 
the Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production Bill, the Minister can decide to withdraw 
or refuse to issue a license for the sub-contractor (interview, Total, June, 2013). 
The political economy of local content  
An important explanation of why local content policies and practices often fail to be implemented 
in the three countries is that they become mired in political processes in general and the ruling 
coalitions’ pursuit of power in particular.  
In Mozambique, key Frelimo elites have been known to win contracts as a way of making sure that 
economic opportunities are restricted to a fraction of members of Frelimo and don’t benefit or 
assist opposition forces (Weimer et al. 2012). This includes the capture of the local content market 
in services and linkages by Frelimo members closely related to the governing coalition of President 
Guebuza. The capture has created a series of monopolies that  has blocked further development 
of an SME base that MNCs can link up to since the mid-2000s (Buur 2014). So while the emerging 
extractive economy is on a scale far exceeding anything experienced so far, the Frelimo ruling 
elites, are positioning themselves to control and benefit from it exclusively. The SMEs that were 
created during the first generation of linkage programmes in Mozambique in connection with 
MOZAL (Castel-Branco and Goldin 2003; Krause and Kaufman 2011), as well as the various 
companies aligned to the Frelimo elite that emerged after the liberalisation of the economy during 
the early 1990s, often in joint ventures with foreign companies, have ‘captured’ the local  content 
market in services and linkages.  
This created bottlenecks around ‘point resources’ and key service domains related to 
consultancies, transport, finance and currency, and import and export (Buur 2014). These 
bottlenecks have also been monopolized by Frelimo elites and trade houses that operate in cartels 
and monopsonies. While this form of ‘linkage patronage’ initially allows the MNCs to become 
linked into the political elite it also becomes costly over time as the lack of competition drives up 
operational costs (Buur 2014). In fact as a result some investors recently began to divest their 
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interests (Rio Tinto in coal and Statoil in gas), but this simply made space for Asian investors to 
take up the still lucrative assets.  
In Tanzania, the organization of power around the CCM has consistently been able to deliver 
stability and legitimacy, while being less successful in creating the conditions for the development 
of productive sectors (see e.g. Therkildsen, 2011; Therkildsen and Bourgouin, 2012; Cooksey, 
2011b). This stability can be explained with reference to the ability of the government to form 
coalitions of the major interests within the ruling party, as well as coalitions with major social 
interests (Therkildsen, 2011; Therkildsen and Bourgouin, 2012). However, while the government 
has promoted stability, it has also, as demonstrated above, been unsuccessful in promoting 
linkage development in Tanzania. One reason is that the interests of private enterprises have been 
weakly represented in the political process. This is partly related to the ethnic dominance of 
Tanzanians of Indian and Arab origin in the formal private sector, which has made the government 
(out of ideological reasons) unwilling or unable to adopt private sector-friendly policies in the past 
(Therkildsen and Bourgouin, 2012). A second reason is related to the survival of a dirigiste mindset 
from the post-independence Ujamaa period, which still plays a large role in political thinking, if not 
rhetorically, then in practice. Cooksey (2011b) argues that there is “a ‘control mentality’ among 
government officials, lack of empathy for business needs, deficiencies in the legal system and 
pervasive corruption”. Many fear, ahead of the mega-investments, that contracts will be awarded 
to clients of the political elite rather than to the most effective and qualified firms, and that 
linkages will be captured by political interests that will use them to reward supporters, buy off 
opponents or generate funds for re-election. While it cannot be documented that ruling elites are 
awarding themselves contracts, Cooksey (2011a) reports on widespread rent-seeking, capture and 
corruption in the earlier Tanzanian gold-mining management. However, he also observes that 
these seem to be a largely un-coordinated activity and that it is difficult to find evidence that 
political elites use gold-mining rents for political patronage or that the rent-seeking activity is 
organized at the central level. 
In Uganda, where oil is not yet being pumped, there has been great controversy over the recent 
Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production Bill, one indication of the general fear that 
potential benefits from the oil sector will be disproportionately accessed by members of the ruling 
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elite (Kjær, 2013). During the process of drafting the bill, the power to negotiate, grant and revoke 
licenses in the oil sector (to all main contracts and sub-contractors) was given to an independent 
authority. However, this was changed on the president’s initiative and placed in the hands of the 
relevant minister, something which is widely interpreted as being an indicator that the ruling elite 
will be able to decide who gets licenses. There are already examples of ruling elites benefiting 
from linkage activities in the oil sector. For example, the president’s younger brothers’ private 
security company has provided most of the guards in the oil area. A loyal ruling party member is 
director of a new training institute in the petroleum sector. Some opposition members go as far as 
to say that oil in Uganda is a ‘Museveni family business.’ (The Observer, Dec 11, 2012: “We lost oil 
vote but not the war”). As a concerned employee in one of the multinational oil companies said: 
“What do I do if the supplier I have chosen because it is the best company is overruled by the 
minister and he forces me to use a bad company?” The general experience of elite use of public 
resources as patronage thus helps create general anxiety about the usage of oil resources (Tangri 
and Mwenda, 2013). 
Discussion 
As demonstrated above, in all three countries, local content has moved to the fore of economic 
development debates as huge mineral, oil and gas deposits have been opened for exploration. In 
all three countries, programmes to ensure local content have been introduced. But in all three 
countries we also see how local content policies have failed to deliver on their promises so far. 
Policies have at best created shallow local linkages and linkages to local ‘middlemen’ and seem to 
lead to much more expensive, and at the same time less reliable, local inputs. Much of the so-
called local inputs are in fact inputs provided by foreign firms and service providers, sometimes 
disguised as local firms by having a local figurehead. Where local content exists, it is mainly local 
firms delivering at inflated prices. Little or no upgrading of local firms seems to take place and the 
capabilities developed do not lead to the development of new activities. The welfare loss from 
ineffective or captured local content practices is difficult to estimate, but there is no doubt that 
costs in terms of foregone investments, waste and diversion of rents to unproductive purposes is 
substantial. This diagnosis from Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique essentially reflects 
experiences from most other sub-Saharan countries, except maybe Botswana and South Africa 
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(Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2011; Hansen, 2013; Buur et al 2013); local content has proven ineffective 
and has at best produced shallow linkages with little industrial development potential.  
This begs the question of why these countries seem destined to fail in creating local content, and 
thus, in a broader sense, to mobilize extractive FDI for industrial development. Here we presented 
two competing interpretations, an economic and a political. From an economic point of view the 
diagnosis is clear and solutions are straightforward: the problems are ill-conceived policies, 
institutional failures and lack of local industrial capability. Governments should focus on improving 
the contractual environment, and develop higher transparency in the local content area. In a 
longer-term perspective, governments should invest in developing local supply industries and 
absorptive capacity through training and education programs and other supplier development 
activities.  
We argue that it is too simplistic to diagnose the apparent inefficient local content practices as a 
technical problem that can easily be rectified. Local content cannot meaningfully be analysed 
solely in terms of economic and institutional efficiency. We also need to analyse local content 
policies and practices as functions of internal political dynamics in African states and to 
understand that political outcomes of local content practices are as important as economic 
outcomes. The political perspective leads us to see that local content is part of the rent-seeking, 
legitimization and maintenance activities of ruling coalitions, and is generally becoming a key 
ingredient in patronage. In fact, we argue that the abovementioned reforms and measures to 
improve the efficiency of local content are at odds with the internal political dynamics of these 
countries. This may explain what puzzles many outside observers, namely why African 
governments simply do not implement the right policies to benefit from extractive FDI.  
The reason is that the economic and institutional efficiency logic is intertwined with the political 
logic related to the political survival of the ruling elites. Where pursuit of economic efficiency 
would dictate open tenders, these are not taking place, because processes that cannot be 
controlled by them would prevent elites from generating rents from the allocation of contracts. 
This was already seen during the first phase of local content development related to the MOZAL 
smelter in Mozambique, where all evaluations point to local content contracts being based on 
political interference. Moreover, open tenders may allow rents to be redistributed to groups 
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unrelated to the ruling elite, allowing for competing centers of power to emerge that may 
eventually challenge the positions of ruling elites. This was seen in Mozambique, where the 
opposition to Frelimo so far has evolved in and around the Beira (central) and Nampula (northern) 
transport corridors (see Weimer et al. 2012).  
Where pursuit of economic efficiency would tie local content to world market prices (allowing for 
a premium on local produce), such measures are not implemented. If local firms were, indeed, 
competitive, this could significantly reduce the rent seeking related to local content    and increase 
the long-term benefits significantly. The pursuit of economic efficiency would dictate long-term 
investments in the development of technological and organizational capabilities of local supply 
industries, but such investments, as we have suggested, are not undertaken because such 
measures would not be seen as benefiting ruling elites in the short term and could even, in the 
long term, pose a threat to established positions. Instead, quasi-monopolistic positions are 
awarded to politically well-connected trade and economic houses. Everything that moves 
economic transactions outside the political sphere will be at best ignored, at worst resented.  
The political perspective offers us what at first can be seen as two partly competing 
interpretations of local content practices. On the one hand, political dynamics of system 
maintenance and legitimization may explain why local content is becoming such a salient policy 
area in the three countries. On the other hand, the  lack of domestic entrepreneurial classes may 
explain why local content is mainly confined to political elites and not to the broader economy.   
Being one of the unregulated spoils of extractive development, local content is becoming a key 
arena of rent-seeking activity, especially as other arenas of rent seeking are becoming increasingly 
constrained (e.g. because aid funds are being reduced or because tax policies are becoming 
professionalized and institutionalized). Especially in Africa’s client-patron based forms of polities, 
local content offers new opportunities for patrons to allocate rents to their key financing 
constituencies as part of securing their own survival. Hence, even though the African local content 
practices appear economically defunct – as they either reward local entrepreneurs with weak (or 
no) capabilities, or more often reward economically expensive monopolies – still, they serve a 
political role that cannot be ignored. Any attempts to promote local content specifically and 
industrial policy generally must take into account the political realities of Africa.  
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Even though new opportunities in service delivery and local content provision are available from 
the present wave of mega-investments, and various investment promoting agencies and linkage 
mechanisms with funding behind them are trying to open up space for newcomers, the successes 
have so far been limited. This is not only because domestic capitalists have generally low 
capabilities, it is also because the SME entrepreneurs are politically weak. They are simply not part 
of the ruling elite. Any attempt at opening up the space for SME newcomers outside the ruling 
elites that have already been accommodated would require changing the present distribution of 
rent opportunities, and this is notoriously difficult (see Whitfield et al. 2015). This is both because 
ruling elites rely on the accumulation of rents and because they attempt to control the 
accumulation process and make sure accumulation stays within the ruling coalition and/or that 
accumulation among capitalists outside the ruling coalition does not undermine the political 
survival of the ruling elite. This strategy seems to be the one pursued by ruling elites in our three 
African countries. 
Conclusion 
The question is what can be done to harness the development potential related to local content in 
a situation like this.  Where the pursuit of economic efficiency would hold that an overhaul of the 
contractual environment would be the starting point of any reform, this will not happen because 
the present institutional environment offers rent-seeking opportunities for ruling elites in 
connection with the awarding of permits, contracts and jobs that form part of sustaining the ruling 
elites’ survival.  
The crux of the matter is that we know too little about how local content can be designed under 
such political circumstances and we know far too little about how different forms of politicization 
and patronage affect linkage development. It is a balancing act between ensuring that local 
content does not violate fundamental strategies of foreign investors such as the need to create 
efficiency and reliability, and making sure the focus is on building the capacity of local domestic 
industry capabilities. Close networks and relations between political and technocratic elites and 
international business are inevitable in countries with a very limited private sector and a recent 
history of state-led development. Furthermore, such relations may be the foundation for a greater 
ability in the future to manage the resources and build competitive local firms (see Niño and 
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Billion 2013). Or alternatively, such monopolisation could form the basis for future conflicts and 
the development of inefficient, resource-driven economies. It cannot be decided in advance which 
road will be taken. Nonetheless, one thing that is certain is that the tendency for linkage formation 
to be politicized and driven towards what we have called ‘linkage patronage’, with consequences 
for realizing the potential of linkages in extractives, seems to be persistent. 
Overall we conclude that local content is becoming an important practice in African extractives, 
here analyzed through the lenses of three East African economies: Tanzania, Mozambique and 
Uganda. We also conclude that these countries have experienced and are facing huge problems in 
making local content work effectively. Experiences from many countries suggest that local content 
violates abstract notions of competition and efficiency. As shown in our three cases, the design of 
local content must take into account not only the industrial and economic context in which they 
are introduced, but also the political context.  
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